主讲人：张敏 副教授

题 目：UI Eligibility Rule, Moral Hazard, and Optimal Unemployment Transfer Scheme

地 点：经济学院106教室

时 间：2016年11月11日（周五）下午15：00——16：30

内 容： This paper derives the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) transfer scheme,UI benefits and UI contribution fees, when a worker has to earn his or her UI eligibility through work, the UI benefits do not last forever, and the UI agency has imperfect monitoring power on the strategic behavior of the worker. We show that the consideration of the UI eligibility rule generates theeffective entitlement effect, which serves as an additional incentive device and alters the nature of the optimal UI transfer scheme established in literature. In contrast with previous studies, we find that when theeffective entitlementeffect is large, it completely removes the moral hazards in job searches, job acceptances, and job quits. As a result, the

optimal UI benefits and contribution fees become constant. Calibrated to the data in the United States, the model reproduces some key features of the existing UI system.

张敏老师系上海财经大学经济学院副教授。张敏老师获得多伦多大学经济学博士学位，主要研究领域为宏观经济学，劳动经济学，已经在Macroeconomic Dynamics，Review of Economic Dynamics，the B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics 等杂志发表多篇论文。

经济学院

2016年10月10日