主讲人：唐莹博士

题 目：Essays on Competition in Electricity and Telecommunications Markets

时 间：2016年10月26日（周三）下午4:00-5:30

地 点：经济学院402会议室

摘要：

U.S. Electricity and telecommunications industries gradually deregulated over the past decades and different phenomenon present.

In this presentation, I will firstly briefly introduce the “sabotaging” paper where my

coauthors and I show that sabotage may be particularly profitable for a vertically-integrated

provider (VIP) when its downstream rival can devote effort to reducing its operating costs.

Then, I will discuss the “market power” paper in which I examine the market power in the

PJM spot energy market from 2010 to 2014. I estimate the elasticity adjusted price cost

margin as a measure of market power, accounting for the fluctuating price elasticity of

demand in the market. I find that inelastic demand can drive up conventional price cost

margin but not necessarily the elasticity adjusted price cost margin. Among the ten large

firms in the PJM wholesale market, I find firms with higher percentage of peaking

generation capacity had higher elasticity adjusted price cost margin. These peaking power

plants exercised excessive market power because they can typically only recover their

capital costs in a short time, when they operate during the peak demand hours.