讲座题目：Information acquisition and disclosure when principal could be self-informed

主办单位：游艇会线路检测中心 华中科技大学创新发展研究中心

面向对象：全院师生

主讲嘉宾：张文灏，华南师范大学经济与管理学院，副研究员

学科方向：应用微观理论

讲座时间：2024年5月23日（周四）上午9：30 开始

讲座地点：游艇会线路检测中心402室

内容提要：Typical sender-receiver game assumes that an expert acquires information about the payoff-relevant state and reports to the decision maker (DM) with possible manipulation of information due to conflict of interests, while the DM cannot personally acquire the information. In reality, we see a boss or leader of organization sometimes performs on-site inspection rather than entirely relies on the information feedback from subordinates. We model this interaction in a sender-receiver game in which the DM can also acquire information despite being less efficient than the expert in doing so. We explore the implication of the DM’s information acquisition capacity on the expert’s incentive on information acquisition and disclosure. Preliminary results include: a more efficient DM can induce higher effort and more disclosure from the expert, a less efficient expert could exert higher effort and disclose more than a more efficient one, and the expert exerts greater effort and discloses more compared to the case where the DM cannot acquire information..

中文翻译：

典型的发送者-接收者博弈假设专家获取与收益相关的状态信息，并向决策者（DM）报告，由于利益冲突可能操纵信息，而DM无法亲自获取信息。实际上，我们有时会看到组织的老板或领导进行现场检查，而不是完全依赖下属的信息反馈。我们在一个发送者-接收者博弈中对这种互动进行建模，在这种博弈中，尽管DM在获取信息方面效率不如专家，但也可以获取信息。我们探讨了DM的信息获取能力对专家信息获取和披露激励的影响。初步结果包括：更高效的DM可以诱使专家提供更多努力和更多披露，效率较低的专家可能比效率较高的专家更加努力并披露更多，专家在获取信息方面会比DM无法获取信息时付出更多努力并披露更多。

讲座嘉宾简介：

张文灏，华南师范大学经济与管理学院，副研究员