讲座题目： Two-stage Chinese College Admission

主讲嘉宾：张军 教授 （南京审计大学社会与经济研究院教授）

讲座时间：2023年5月11日（周四）下午14：00--16：00

讲座地点：华中科技大学经济学院402室

摘要：The college admission system of China has used a two-stage procedure for decades: within a tier, the first stage sends each student’s application to at most one college; the second stage assigns college applicants to majors. Students who are rejected in the second stage cannot go back to the first stage to apply for other colleges, which incentivizes students to accept options called major transfer in their rank-order lists. We demonstrate the deficiencies of this two-stage procedure. For the currently used Chinese Parallel Mechanism (CPM), we propose an improvement (RPM) by combining the two stages into one stage. We also document the most recent reform in the system and notice that a new mechanism (IPM) equivalent to the renowned deferred acceptance algorithm has been used by some provinces. However, most provinces still prefer CPM over IPM. We run lab experiments to compare the three mechanisms (CPM, RPM, IPM). Results support RPM as an appealing mechanism: the three mechanisms are close in efficiency, while RPM compromises between IPM and CPM in terms of fairness and college welfare; RPM corrects students’ incentive regarding major transfer options; RPM is a minimal redesign of CPM so that it can be acceptable for most provinces in the reform.

中文摘要：

几十年来，中国的大学录取制度一直采用两阶段的程序:第一阶段将每个学生的申请最多发送到一所大学;第二阶段为大学申请者分配专业。在第二阶段被拒绝的学生不能回到第一阶段申请其他大学，这促使学生在他们的排名列表中接受被称为专业转换的选择。我们证明了这两阶段程序的缺陷。对于目前使用的中国并联机构(CPM)，我们提出了将两个阶段合并为一个阶段的改进(RPM)。我们还记录了系统中最近的改革，并注意到一些省份已经使用了一种相当于著名的延迟接受算法的新机制(IPM)。然而，大多数省份仍然倾向于CPM而不是IPM。我们运行实验室实验来比较三种机制(CPM, RPM, IPM)。结果表明，RPM是一种吸引机制:三种机制在效率上接近，而RPM在公平和大学福利方面介于IPM和CPM之间;RPM纠正了学生对专业转学选择的动机;RPM是CPM的最小重新设计，因此它可以被大多数省份在改革中接受。

讲座嘉宾简介：

张军，博士，南京审计大学社会与经济研究院教授，致力于市场设计的理论及应用研究，近年在American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior，Economic Theory等国际期刊上发表多篇论文。获国家自然科学基金优秀青年项目、青年项目、中国信息经济学会乌家培资助计划资助。